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COINSENSUS: The Need for Uniform
National Virtual Currency Regulations
Anisha Reddy*
ABSTRACT
Google search volume for bitcoin and bitcoin-related
keywords increased by as much as 1000 percent in 2017 from pre-
vious years.  This increased interest comes hand-in-hand with in-
creased regulatory and legislative scrutiny.  Currently, there is
disparate regulation for virtual currencies across national and
state borders alike.  States’ promulgation of various and incon-
gruous virtual currency regulations have forced service providers
to withdraw from different states within the country.  However,
transactions are not contained within state lines, and disparate
state-by-state regulation is impracticable.
The Uniform Law Commission recognized the need for uni-
form guidance for those entering the North American market
and drafted the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Busi-
nesses Act for each state to adopt in 2017.  This Comment argues
that every state should implement language identical or similar to
the Uniform Law Commission’s proposed regulation.
Implementing a uniform regulation applicable to clearly de-
fined entities in this explosively growing field would provide har-
mony amongst the states and create an environment where both
service providers and end-users have clear guidance on how to
conform to the law.  Further, regulatory clarity would provide
consumers with much needed protection.
This Comment begins by examining the history and develop-
ment of bitcoin and blockchain assets.  Next, this Comment dis-
cusses the need for regulations in the United States.  Then, this
Comment provides an overview of the existing laws and regula-
tions at both state and federal levels, and examines the simulta-
neous yet inconsistent legal characterizations imposed on virtual
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currencies. Virtual currencies can be:  a piece of property, a se-
curity, a commodity, and of course, a currency.  This Comment
further analyzes the language and criticisms of the Uniform Law
Commission’s proposed Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency
Businesses Act.  Finally, this Comment argues that the adoption
of a uniform regulation is vital for the blockchain community’s
continued existence in America.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted federal securities regulations after the failure
of “blue sky” state securities laws to adequately address securities
abuses that led to the Stock Market Crash and ensuing Great De-
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pression.1   Although blockchain-based economies are not nearly as
widely relied upon as nation-based economies, regulators should
not let history repeat itself.2  Bitcoin, the most widely adopted vir-
tual currency, is a functional currency in countries where the na-
tional currency is no longer feasible.3   This increase in adoption
comes hand-in-hand with increased reliance, which inevitably leads
to consumer vulnerability.4
To address the issues that arise from increased reliance on vir-
tual currencies properly, states have begun to regulate the virtual
currency space.5  Many state-enacted and proposed regulations are
inconsistent; in some cases, they are in direct opposition.6  Ex-
tremely prohibitive regulations in Hawaii have gone as far as forc-
ing service providers to cease operations.7  Additionally, federal
regulators have begun to issue guidance and conduct enforcement
actions.8  However, uniform regulation is necessary because trans-
actions travel across state lines.9
This Comment suggests that each state should adopt the lan-
guage developed by the Uniform Law Commission in the Uniform
Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act.10  The Uniform
Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act provides clear gui-
1. Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Ap-
proach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1376
(2013).
2. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regula-
tion in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 344 (2015) (“[S]hould Bitcoin be-
come a true competitor to government backed currencies . . . protections . . . need
to be implemented.”).
3. See infra note 50 (discussing Venezuela’s increasing reliance on virtual cur-
rencies); see also Cady Voge, Where Could Bitcoin Succeed as a Currency? In a
Failed State, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Dmwph6 (analyzing the severe
inflation of the bolivar, forcing Venezuelans to “turn[ ] to bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies . . . precisely because their government has nothing to do with
it.”).
4. See infra Part II.D.
5. See Tu & Meredith supra note 2, at 304 (“[R]egulatory bodies, courts and
state legislatures have acted independently resulting in a regulatory mishmash of
guidance, clarification, extension and ongoing discussion.”).
6. See Tu & Meredith supra note 2, at 234 (“[C]ontinuing on this path for
developing virtual currency regulation may lead to a confusing and complex, or
even incoherent regulatory environment . . . .”).
7. See Stan Higgins, Coinbase Just Stopped Serving Bitcoin Customers in Ha-
waii, COINBASE (Feb. 27, 2017), http://bit.ly/2DhBWWe.
8. See infra Part II.E.2.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT (NAT’L CON-
FERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
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dance and safeguards for end-users as well as proprietors of virtual
currency businesses.11
This Comment begins with a historical and technical overview
of blockchains, the foundational structure of virtual currencies.12
Part II provides an overview of how these virtual currencies are
prone to misuse.13  Part II then provides an overview of select
American laws and regulations at both the state and federal
levels.14
Part III of this Comment describes the mission and drafting
process of the Uniform Law Commission.15  Part III further ana-
lyzes the uniform regulation, addresses criticisms to the regulation,
and submits that state-by-state implementation of the regulation
would create a feasible degree of virtual currency regulatory har-
mony across the country.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is a Blockchain?
The mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto17 introduced the revolution-
ary concept of a blockchain in his seminal white paper18 detailing
Bitcoin, a novel digital payment system stored on a blockchain.19  A
blockchain, also referred to as a distributed ledger, is a “chronologi-
cal database of transactions recorded by a network of computers.”20
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.A–B.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part II.E.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B–C.
17. Alec Liu, Who Is Satoshi Nakamoto, the Creator of Bitcoin?,
MOTHERBOARD (May 22, 2013), http://bit.ly/2xFjZuG.  Nakamoto is said to be a
pseudonym for a person or a group of people. Id.  Although Nakamoto’s online
presence is scarce, various players in the digital currency space have either been
accused of being Nakamoto or claimed to be him. Id.
18. A white paper is:
[A]n article that states . . . a not-too-detailed technical explanation of an
architecture, framework, or product technology.  Typically, a white paper
explains the results, conclusions, or construction resulting from some or-
ganized committee or research collaboration or design and development
effort.
Margaret Rouse, White Paper, TECHTARGET, http://bit.ly/2zngg7f (last visited
Sept. 7, 2018).
19. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN.ORG (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
20. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Tech-
nology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished manu-
script), http://bit.ly/2zmRjJa; see also Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth
About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 118, 118 (describing a
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Although the typical conceptualization of a ledger21 is a record of
financial transactions, the uses of blockchain technology can extend
well beyond financial implementations.22
The network of computers that record information on a
blockchain is a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, and each computer on
the network is a node.23  A P2P network, also referred to as a dis-
tributed network, sets the blockchain infrastructure apart from a
classical database because the P2P network ensures no singular en-
tity controls the blockchain.24  The idea of “decentralized trust” is a
key component to blockchain technology, and ensures that no third
party can “serv[e] as a gatekeeper[ ] of the internet.”25
B. The Bitcoin Blockchain
Through the development of Bitcoin,26 Nakamoto envisioned a
“digital analog to old-fashioned gold:  a new kind of universal
money that could be owned by everyone and spent anywhere.”27
Instead of a central authority like a nation or a bank controlling the
currency, the currency Nakamoto proposed would function within a
decentralized P2P network on the Internet.28  Instead of a central
administrator, nodes maintain the Bitcoin network by connecting
their computers directly to the network.29
blockchain as “an open, distributed ledger that can record transactions between
two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way.”).
21. See Ledger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
22. See SA Mathieson, Blockchain Starts to Prove Its Value Outside of Fi-
nance, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 2017), http://bit.ly/2MSgmHm (describing
various implementations and proposed implementations of blockchains to store
information, for example, tracking medicine temperature during transportation
and diamond and fine wine certifications).
23. See Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The Invisible Technology That’s Changing
the World, PCMAG (Aug. 29, 2017, 1:38 PM), http://bit.ly/2QQQUoN.
24. See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGI-
NEERING AND ECONOMICS 3–4 (2015).
25. Marvin, supra note 23.
26. The rationale behind the nomenclature used when referring to the Bitcoin
protocol and bitcoin as a currency functions as follows:
Bitcoin with a capital “B” is typically associated with Bitcoin the protocol
and payment network.  The uppercase form, “Bitcoin,” is also often used
to refer to as the ecosystem as a whole. . . . Bitcoin with a lowercase “b”
written as “bitcoin” is usually associated specifically with bitcoin as the
currency.
Blockchain Team, Drawing the Distinction Between the Uppercase “B” and Lower-
case “b” in Bitcoin, BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Dec. 29, 2014), http://bit.ly/2xwmqR8.
27. NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY at X (2015).
28. See Nakamoto, supra note 19, at 1.
29. Id.
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1. How Does Bitcoin Work?
When a user initiates a transaction, nodes from across the P2P
network collectively verify its integrity.30  Nodes run the Bitcoin
software and “keep [B]itcoin running by participating in the relay
of information.”31  Nodes review the entire Bitcoin network to en-
sure that the user initiating the transaction has the funds to spend
and is not trying to concurrently spend them elsewhere.32  Once
verified, miners, a special type of node, collect a series of pending
transactions “and turn them into a mathematical puzzle” known as
a block of transactions.33  The first miner to solve the puzzle distrib-
utes their solution to the other miners on the network.34  The trans-
action is valid after a certain number of miners solve the problem
and achieve the same result.35
Once validated, the “block[s] [are] cryptographically added to
the ledger and the miners move on to the next set of transac-
tions.”36  This validation process is a “proof-of-work” consensus
mechanism.37  Miners use their computing powers to verify transac-
tions because the act of verifying a transaction “mines” new
bitcoins, which are then rewarded to the miners.38
Each block in a chain contains information linking the new
block to the block preceding it.39  Because the newly added block
contains the information from the block before it, the blockchain is
immutable and each transaction is irreversible.40  A block is fully
30. See Rebecca Grant, Bitcoin for Idiots: An Introductory Guide, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Feb. 17, 2014), http://bit.ly/2xH55Ep.
31. Noelle Acheson, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2018),
http://bit.ly/2I8V1Ja.
32. Id.
33. See L.S., How Bitcoin Mining Works, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2015), https://
econ.st/2O3pJZo; see also id. (noting that some nodes are miners).
34. Id.
35. See Joseph Bonneau, How Long Does It Take for a Bitcoin Transaction
To Be Confirmed?, COINCENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), http://bit.ly/2I73Gf1.
36. L.S., supra note 33.
37. ADAM BACK ET AL., ENABLING BLOCKCHAIN INNOVATIONS THROUGH
PEGGED SIDECHAINS 3 (2014), http://www.blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf.
38. Nakamoto, supra note 19, at 4.
39. The information on the block is also known as a hash value, which in-
cludes information relaying the contents of the block, a timestamp, and the hash
value of the preceding block.  Nakamoto, supra note 19, at 7; see also How Do
Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK, http://bit.ly/2xwo0T4 (last updated Jan.
28, 2018) (“[A] hash is produced by a ‘hash function,’ which is a complex math
equation that reduces any amount of text or data to 64-character string”).
40. See Paul Coletti, Bitcoin’s Baby: Blockchain’s ‘Tamper-Proof’ Revolution,
BBC (May 20, 2015), https://bbc.in/2O0OJk9.
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confirmed once miners add six additional blocks to the original.41
In theory, miners will continue to verify transactions on the longest
chain because the most processing power and verifications would
have gone into building the longest chain; it is the chain least likely
to contain falsely verified transactions.42
Although one of the main attractions of Bitcoin is its anonym-
ity, sophisticated users are still able to trace transactions, albeit with
some difficulty, through the “public key” that labels each transac-
tion.43  Users concerned with this pseudo-anonymity have ad-
dressed the issue by creating “coin mixing” tools which allow
multiple users to mix their coins together on one transaction block,
rendering specific addresses relatively indiscernible.44
2. The Benefits of Bitcoin as a Currency
In his white paper, Nakamoto criticized a major failing within
the traditional banking framework of relying on third parties, typi-
cally financial institutions, to electronically process transactions.45
Transacting electronically through an intermediary, instead of di-
rectly P2P, requires both the consumer and the intermediary to
trust the third-party institution.46  As Nakamoto posited:
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable.  These
costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by us-
ing physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments
over a communications channel without a trusted party.  What is
needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic
proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact
directly with each other without the need for a trusted third
party.47
41. See Joseph Bonneau, How Long Does It Take for a Bitcoin Transaction to
Be Confirmed?, COINCENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), http://bit.ly/2I73Gf1.  A transaction is
considered confirmed after six blocks have been added to its block, because if
blocks are added after the original block, the immutable quality of the ledger fur-
ther confirms that the user sending the funds cannot double-spend the funds from
the original transaction. Id.
42. Nakamoto, supra note 19, at 3.  An attacker seeking to tamper with the
information on a block would have to re-do the proof of work on that block and
then change subsequent blocks to succeed unnoticed. Id.
43. Grant, supra note 30.
44. Kyle Torpey, Path Towards Better Privacy in Bitcoin Becomes Clearer, But
Will Still Take Time, COINJOURNAL (Nov. 18, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xCUGJO.
45. Nakamoto, supra note 19, at 1 (criticizing reversible and trust-based pay-
ment systems perpetuated by financial institutions and emphasizing the need for
irreversible payment systems that eliminate the chance of fraud).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Nakamoto theorized that P2P bitcoin transactions would not
require trust because they are irreversible once recorded.48  Addi-
tionally, users would not be vulnerable to a third-party financial in-
stitution retaining their payment information.49  The untethered
aspect of bitcoin as a currency is especially “attractive to people in
countries[ ] like China and Zimbabwe, where the government has a
history of seizing bank accounts and assets.”50
C. The Evolution of the Blockchain
1. Use of Bitcoin
Over 100,000 merchants currently accept bitcoin as a form of
payment, including Overstock.com, Microsoft, and Apple’s Appli-
cation Store.51  Hedge funds have incorporated virtual currencies
into their service offerings.52  Tenants can now pay rent with various
virtual currencies.53  Parents can pay for their children’s elite pre-
school education with bitcoin.54  Payment services companies have
also embraced the new form of currency.55  As bitcoin becomes an
48. See Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Feb. 20, 2014), http://bit.ly/2DmQwfc;
Coletti, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
49. Id. Users would be less vulnerable to identity theft if there was no need to
provide sensitive information to external service providers such as merchants and
financial institutions.
50. Nathaniel Popper, As Bitcoin Scrapes $10,000, an Investment Boom Like
No Other, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2QKpJfo.  In some regions,
use of bitcoin has become a necessity:
[As] Venezuela’s national currency loses value at a catastrophic rate,
thousands have begun turning to . . . cryptocurrency to salvage what little
value remains from their increasingly worthless bolivars . . . [f]ollowing
the debt crisis in Greece, hyperinflation in Zimbabwe[,] and unrest in
Ukraine, rising numbers of distressed citizens [are] utiliz[ing] bitcoin.
Id.; see also Christine Armario, Venezuelans Seeing Bitcoin Boom as Survival, Not
Speculation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 13, 2017).
51. See Ethan Wolff-Mann, Big Bitcoin–Friendly Companies like Microsoft
and Expedia Hedge Their Bet, YAHOO FIN. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://yhoo.it/
2DaLouB; Anthony Cuthbertson, Cryptocurrency News Round-Up: Apple Accepts
Bitcoin for Apps & Cryptocurrency Divorces, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 3, 2014),
http://bit.ly/2OMSZB2.
52. See Nathaniel Popper, Hedge Funds Push the Price of Bitcoin to New
Highs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2MTrDr9.
53. See Nikhilesh De, Paying Rent with Crypto? App for Tenants Adds BTC,
LTC, ETH, COINDESK (Dec. 1, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xJfwaC.
54. See Bitcoin Accepted at New York Pre-School, BBC (June 30, 2017),
https://bbc.in/2NvPJgv.
55. E.g., Lily Katz, Square Is Letting You Buy Bitcoin on Your Phone,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2017), https://bloom.bg/2I3mTy4.
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increasingly widespread form of payment throughout the world,
blockchain technology will continue to develop.56
2. The Birth of Alt-Coins
Since the creation of the bitcoin, over 1,800 alternative virtual
currencies (commonly referred to as “alt-coins”) have emerged.57
Although critics deride many alt-coins as money-making schemes,58
some have gained large followings.59  The Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund acknowledges that even if virtual cur-
rencies are volatile, it would be unwise to dismiss them altogether.60
Cryptocurrency protocols with comparable user-bases to Bitcoin in-
clude Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Monero.61  The
various ways that alt-coins diverge from Bitcoin include consensus
mechanisms,62 methods of distribution,63 and transaction verifica-
tion speeds.64
Experts consider Ethereum the most viable “rival” to
Bitcoin.65  Ethereum is a blockchain protocol that enables users to
execute smart contracts and even has its own digital asset, ether.66
Smart contracts on Ethereum are applications that run without an
intermediary; for example, Apple is an intermediary that controls
56. See Where Can I Spend Bitcoin?, COINBASE (Dec. 18, 2017), http://bit.ly/
2xu9P0T; see also Map of Bitcoin Accepting Venues, COINMAP, https://
coinmap.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
57. See CryptoCurrency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP, https://
coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (listing every cryptocurrency cur-
rently on the market by current fiat value, volume of trade, and supply in use).
58. See, e.g., Joon Ian Wong, Eager Cryptocurrency Investors Have Sunk
Thousands of Dollars into Joke Tokens, QUARTZ (July 7, 2017), https://qz.com/
1023501.
59. See Josiah Wilmoth, What Is an Altcoin?, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (Dec. 9,
2014), http://bit.ly/2puwx4m.
60. See Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, Central
Banking and Fintech—A Brave New World?, Address at Bank of England Confer-
ence, in INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 29, 2017), http://bit.ly/2I5j0c7.
61. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 57.
62. See Gleb Kostarev, Review of Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms, WAVES
PLATFORM (July 31, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xDrvGx (explaining the various mecha-
nisms blockchain protocols implement for miners to agree to the validity of any
given transaction).
63. See Vitalik Buterin, On Long-Term Cryptocurrency Distribution Models,
ETHEREUM BLOG (May 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/2Dnky2n (explaining the various
ways cryptocurrency protocols can be structured to distribute coins to users).
64. Wilmoth, supra note 59.
65. See Lily Katz, Bitcoin Is at Risk of No Longer Being the Biggest Digital
Currency, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2017), https://bloom.bg/2QQNXF4.
66. Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK,
http://bit.ly/2psci7B (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (“[S]mart contracts are programs
that execute exactly as they are set up by their creators.”).
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which applications it offers on the Application Store.67  Interest-
ingly, the advent of Ethereum has led to an increased rate of
blockchain-asset crowdfunding, referred to as an I.C.O. (initial coin
offering).68  Some attribute this rise in I.C.O.s to Ethereum’s plia-
bility, which makes it simple to create a new virtual currency on the
Ethereum blockchain.69
Some alt-coins forgo providing payment services altogether.70
For example, Numerai created a coin that functions as an offshoot
of the Ethereum blockchain.71  Data scientists compete for numer-
aire, Numerai’s coin, by creating trading algorithms.72
3. Other Uses of Blockchain Technology
Governments throughout the world have invested considerable
resources into researching how to integrate blockchain technology
into various services.73  Dubai, in particular, launched an initiative
aimed at making it the first “city built on blockchain.”74  In fact, in
October 2017, the Dubai Land Department announced that it
would be the first governmental agency to conduct all land transac-
tions using a blockchain.75
Similarly, the state of Illinois is currently exploring how
blockchain technology is ripe for implementation within the gov-
ernment.76  In August 2017, the Illinois Blockchain Initiative, a con-
sortium of state and county agencies, announced a pilot digital
67. Id.; Linda Xie, A Beginner’s Guide to Ethereum Tokens, COINBASE BLOG
(May 22, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xu8Zkr.
68. Jason Rowley, How Ethereum Became the Platform of Choice for ICO’d
Digital Assets, TECHCRUNCH (June 8, 2017), http://tcrn.ch/2sHUMwm.
69. Xie, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. NUMERAI, HTTPS://NUMER.AI/ (LAST VISITED Sept. 8, 2018); see also
Numerai, CRUNCHBASE, http://bit.ly/2O6t8Xk (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (describ-
ing Numerai as a platform used to compare multiple financial models, where data
scientists are ranked and rewarded according to their work on any given project).
72. Cade Metz, An AI Hedge Fund Created a New Currency to Make Wall
Street Work Like Open Source, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2017), http://bit.ly/2MRWKTW
(describing how Numeraire works).
73. See Steve Cheng et al., Using Blockchain to Improve Data Management in
the Public Sector, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Feb. 2017), http://bit.ly/2xFj64T (dis-
cussing proposed and implemented blockchain use by the governments of Estonia,
Sweden, the Republic of Georgia, Delaware, and more).
74. See Nikhil Lohade, Dubai Aims to Be a City Built on Blockchain, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/2I3VVX5 (discussing the Dubai govern-
ment’s goal to migrate government services onto blockchain-based systems).
75. Press Release, Gov’t of Dubai, Dubai Land Department Becomes World’s
First Government Entity to Conduct All Transactions Through Blockchain Net-
work (Oct. 7, 2017), http://bit.ly/2O6ubXg.
76. About, ILL. BLOCKCHAIN INITIATIVE, https://illinoisblockchain.tech/about
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK106.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-OCT-18 14:39
2018] COINSENSUS 261
identity registration program which utilizes blockchain technology
to store and seal identity attributes such as date of birth and blood
type.77
Over 11,500 patent filings use the term “blockchain.”78  The
diversity of filings include uses like tamper-free voting79 and energy
sharing across a smart power grid.80  Additionally, financial service
giants like Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, and Fidelity are moving
toward integrating blockchain technology into their service offer-
ings.81  Several of the world’s largest banks recognize the impor-
tance of virtual currency and are working collaboratively to create
uniform standards for blockchain technology.82
Non-profit organizations also recognize the unique uses of
blockchain technology.83  For example, Bail Bloc, a collaborative
initiative between two non-profit organizations, aims to utilize ex-
cess computer processing power to mine Monero, an alt-coin.84
Once the Bail Bloc user mines Monero, Bail Bloc converts Monero
into U.S. dollars which the Bronx Freedom Fund uses to fund bail
for low-income New York residents accused of misdemeanors.85
Another non-profit organization, the Sovrin Foundation, aims to
use a blockchain protocol to create a “self-sovereign identity net-
work.”86  Sovrin implements a public blockchain that empowers
77. Press Release, Ill. Blockchain Initiative, Illinois Partners with Evernym to
Launch Birth Registration Pilot (Aug. 31, 2017), http://bit.ly/2QQwPiI; see also
Blockchain in Illinois, ILL. DEP’T INNOVATION & TECH., http://bit.ly/2xJ0nWw
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (describing the Illinois Blockchain Initiative).
78. PATENTSCOPE, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://bit.ly/2xIdBmj (last
visited Sept. 8, 2018) (search:  “ALLTXT:(blockchain OR bitcoin OR “block
chain”)”).  The number of patent filings continues to rise; this count was last up-
dated on August 10, 2018.
79. U.S. Patent No. 9,836,908 (filed Aug. 6, 2015).
80. U.S. Patent Application No. 15/292,783, Publication No. US 2017/0103468
A1 (published Apr. 13, 2017) (TransActive Grid Inc., applicant).
81. See Dakin Campbell, Goldman Sachs to Explore Starting Bitcoin Trading
Venture, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2017), https://bloom.bg/2znlXlB; Hadley Stern, To-
gether We Can Define the Future of Blockchain Technology, FIDELITYLABS (May
25, 2017), http://bit.ly/2NvNLwS; Is Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) A
Banking Fad or Fixture?, J.P. MORGAN, http://bit.ly/2pushli (last visited Sept. 8,
2018).
82. See The R3 Story, R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2018).
83. See Paul Lamb, Transforming the Social Sector: Bitcoin and Blockchain
for Good, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2puGHlH (describing
how charities are creating coins for I.C.O.s to raise funds, implementing
blockchains to track aid, and creating infrastructures to secure voting).
84. About, BAIL BLOC, http://bit.ly/2pqZjD2 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
85. Id.
86. SOVRIN, HTTPS://SOVRIN.ORG/ABOUT/ (LAST VISITED Sept. 8, 2017) (the
“self-sovereign identity network” created by Sovrin seeks to eliminate the need for
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both individual users and entities to create protected identities and
regain control over their identifying information.87  Since the 2017
Equifax data breach, using a blockchain for identity management
has been a timely topic of discussion throughout the information
security community.88
D. Misuse of Blockchain Technology
Bitcoin is prone to misuse due to its lack of centralized admin-
istration, its pseudonymous nature, and its transaction speed.89
Such misuses underscore the need for regulation of virtual currency
businesses.
“The Silk Road,” one of most nefarious possible applications
of virtual currency, was an online black market that propelled vir-
tual currency into the public vernacular.90  The Silk Road, a “digital
marketplace for illicit trade,” used a combination of “an anony-
mous interface with traceless payments in the digital currency
bitcoin . . . [to] allow[ ] thousands of drug dealers and nearly 1 mil-
lion eager worldwide customers to find each other—and their drugs
of choice—in the familiar realm of ecommerce.”91  Although dis-
ruption of the Silk Road stymied the use of bitcoin as a currency for
illegal drugs,92 virtual currencies remain a payment mechanism
used to procure illicit materials and fund human trafficking, mostly
a “patchwork” of identity validation mechanisms, such as government issued iden-
tification papers and usernames, and instead create a blockchain-based credential
verifying system).
87. Id.
88. Ron Miller, The Promise of Managing Identity on the Blockchain, TECH-
CRUNCH (Sept. 10, 2017), https://tcrn.ch/2NZKl4L (discussing the use and viability
of implementing self-sovereign identities on a blockchain).
89. Matt Schiavenza, Without Drugs, What’s the Point of Bitcoin?, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 17, 2015), http://bit.ly/2I4rhgu (“Unlike modern fiat currencies like the U.S.
dollar, Bitcoin has no supervising authority, no regulation, and no central bank. . . .
As an unregulated currency, Bitcoin appeared to be a natural fit for the illicit drug
market.”).
90. Grace Caffyn, Bitcoin on the Dark Web: The Facts, COINDESK (Sept. 23,
2015), http://bit.ly/2OIeBOS (“Bitcoin has been the de facto currency of the Dark
Web—the ‘hidden’ Internet accessible only by Tor—since the pioneering market-
place Silk Road, the ‘eBay of drugs’, arrived in 2011.”); see also Marco Santori,
Silk Road Goes Dark: Bitcoin Survives Its Biggest Market’s Demise, COINDESK
(May 5, 2017), http://bit.ly/2MXTF4Q (“As the Silk Road grew in popularity, so
did recognition that bitcoin could be used for illicit activity, and so did the govern-
ment’s interest in it.”).
91. Joshuah Bearman & Tomer Hanuka, The Rise and Fall of Silk Road, Pt. 1,
WIRED, http://bit.ly/2O1K2Gz (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
92. Id.
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due to the ease at which users can transmit funds without providing
sensitive personal information to service providers.93
Although instances are few and far between, some individuals
and entities fund terrorist groups through use of virtual currency.94
Terrorist organizations such as ISIS have used virtual currency in
Indonesia95 and the United States.96  Organizations like the
Blockchain Alliance combat such uses of bitcoin by educating and
providing “technical assistance” to law enforcement agencies.97
Notwithstanding such efforts, partnerships of this sort are the ex-
ception to the norm.98
The decentralized, pseudonymous, and speedy nature of trans-
actions also fosters the use of virtual currencies for money launder-
ing.99  In the 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) recognized that virtual currencies
have become an emerging threat allowing illicit enterprises to laun-
der proceeds from illegal ventures and transfer the funds
internationally.100
Bitcoin has also been the currency of choice for many recent
ransomware attacks.101  Ransomware is a low-cost, simple method
for hackers to infect computers and demand bitcoin while exposing
themselves to little risk.102  Hackers take advantage of the anonym-
ity provided by bitcoin and coin-mixers when holding information
gleaned from hacks at ransom until paid off.103
93. Popper, supra note 50; see also Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Foundation
Plays Down Silk Road Connection at Senate Hearing, COINDESK (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://bit.ly/2Dn0bCn.
94. Zachary K. Goldman et al., Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies, CNAS
(May 3, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xFKIrc.
95. See Resty Woro Yuniar, Bitcoin, PayPal Used to Finance Terrorism, Indo-
nesian Agency Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/2xvhJXy.
96. See ISIS Fundraising in US via Bitcoin, RT (Jan. 30, 2015), http://bit.ly/
2xxsCIq.
97. BLOCKCHAIN ALLIANCE, HTTP://BLOCKCHAINALLIANCE.ORG/ (LAST VIS-
ITED SEPT. 8, 2018).
98. See Yaya Fanusie, The New Frontier in Terror Fundraising: Bitcoin, CI-
PHER BRIEF (Aug. 24, 2016), http://bit.ly/2zmIn6n.
99. Nicholas J. Ajello, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Bitcoin, Money
Laundering, and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 435, 446–47 (2015).
100. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 130 (2017), http://bit.ly/2DmSYlU.
101. Joseph Cox, Kidnappers Around the World Want Their Ransoms Paid in
Bitcoin, MOTHERBOARD (July 4, 2017), http://bit.ly/2PVJsHH; see Robert Moir,
Defining Malware: FAQ, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Oct. 1, 2003), http://bit.ly/
2QQaVMs.
102. See sources cited supra note 101.
103. See sources cited supra note 101.
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Additionally, consumers are vulnerable when transacting in
bitcoin.104  Thefts have plagued Bitcoin service providers since
2011.105  Experienced and inexperienced investors alike are prone
to being taken advantage of by nefarious actors in the virtual cur-
rency community.106  Recently, a virtual currency exchange plat-
form experienced a loss of more than one million dollars due to
hacks, begging the question of whether an exchange has the money
it claims to hold.107  Consumer vulnerability is also a significant
concern for I.C.O.s.  In 2018, tech-giants Google,108 Facebook,109
and Twitter110 went as far as implementing bans against virtual cur-
rency advertisements on their websites.111
E. Current Blockchain-Asset Regulations in America
In the global economy, blockchain-asset regulation has taken
various forms; different jurisdictions impose a spectrum of regula-
tions which encompass indifference,112 permissiveness,113 and hos-
104. See Alex Hern, A History of Bitcoin Hacks, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://bit.ly/2PVJOy1.
105. Id.
106. See Laura Shin, Hackers Have Stolen Millions of Dollars in Bitcoin—
Using Only Phone Numbers, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2016), http://bit.ly/2tgc9ss
(“[B]itcoin scams . . . have hit everyone from everyday people to hospitals . . . .”).
107. Nathaniel Popper, Warning Signs About Another Giant Bitcoin Ex-
change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ptVlK3.
108. Financial Services: New Restricted Financial Products Policy (June 2018),
GOOGLE (Mar. 2018), http://bit.ly/2O88V3L.
109. Rob Leathern, New Ads Policy: Improving Integrity and Security of Fi-
nancial Product and Services Ads, FACEBOOK BUS. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://bit.ly/
2xDs6YN.
110. Tommy Wilkes & Fanny Potkin, Twitter to Ban Cryptocurrency Ads from
Tuesday as Online Crackdown Widens, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://reut.rs/
2NsN4UQ.  Interestingly, although Twitter will ban advertisements of I.C.O.s and
token sales, Twitter’s chief executive and co-founder is also founder and C.E.O. of
Square, a mobile payments company that has expanded its offerings to include
bitcoin trading. See Getting Started with Bitcoin in Cash App, SQUAREUP, https://
squ.re/2pscNhZ (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).  This move to ban other trading plat-
forms from advertising on Twitter may be more self-serving than beneficial to con-
sumers. See About Us, SQUAREUP, https://squareup.com/about (last visited Sept.
8, 2018).
111. Lily Hay Newman, Why It’s So Easy to Hack Cryptocurrency Startup
Fundraisers, WIRED (Sept. 7, 2017), http://bit.ly/2PWZkKa (“[C]riminals have
been carrying off most of the scams around ICOs through . . . phishing campaigns
and social media manipulation . . . masquerade[ing] as legitimate administrators of
ICOs so they can disseminate fake information to potential investors . . . about
where to send money . . . .”).
112. LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., REGULATION
OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 22 (2014), http://bit.ly/2xty4MI (“No for-
mal regulations on the bitcoin exist in Turkey.”).
113. Id. at 20 (“Slovenia issued a formal opinion about the status of the
bitcoin . . . [stating that] bitcoin is not a monetary means under Slovenian law and
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tility.114  Even within many jurisdictions of the United States,
regulations take differing and sometimes divergent shapes.115  The
current state of financial regulations and policies are aptly referred
to as “Franken-finance” because the laws are “full of absurd contra-
dictions [and] incongruities.”116  The fact that there has been “no
clean transition from one technology to the next” further exacer-
bates the incongruities in financial regulations across the country.117
Both state and federal regulatory agencies struggle to address
cryptocurrencies in a uniform manner.
1. Statewide Regulation of Virtual Currency
Disparate state regulations frustrate both proprietors and end-
users because any given state may (1) not recognize virtual curren-
cies as fiat currency, (2) outlaw I.C.O.s, (3) recognize virtual curren-
cies as fiat currency, (4) permit blockchain use in trading, (5)
impose strict licensing requirements, or (6) deny all attempts to be-
come licensed.118
Texas regulators do not consider virtual currency a fiat cur-
rency and thus do not subject virtual currency businesses to money
transmitter regulations.119  The definition of virtual currency in
Texas is “an electronic medium of exchange typically used to
purchase goods and services from certain merchants or to exchange
for other currencies, either virtual or [fiat].”120   However, if an in-
termediary becomes involved and facilitates the interaction of vir-
tual currencies with a fiat currency, that intermediary may be
subject to financial regulations in Texas.121  Similarly, in 2014, Kan-
not a financial instrument . . . [but warned that the] taxation of bitcoin income still
warrants review on an individual basis.”).
114. See Kai Sedgewick, Five Countries Where Bitcoin Is Illegal, BITCOIN.COM
(Nov. 17, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xye9fr/; BITCOIN.COM, HTTP://MAP.BITLEGAL.IO/
(LAST VISITED SEPT. 8, 2018) (describing Bitcoin regulations by country with an
interactive map); see also BITLEGAL, HTTP://BITLEGAL.IO/LIST.PHP (LAST VISITED
SEPT. 8, 2018) (listing descriptions of Bitcoin regulatory schemes as permissive,
contentious, or hostile).
115. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at 304.
116. See DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION:
HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN AND OTHER CRYPTOCURRENCIES IS
CHANGING THE WORLD 56 (2018).
117. Id.
118. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at 313.
119. See generally Memorandum from Charles G. Cooper, Tex. Banking
Comm’r, to All Virtual Currency Companies Operating or Desiring to Operate in
Texas (Apr. 3, 2014), http://bit.ly/2puHa7r.
120. Id. at 1.
121. Id. at 3.
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sas announced that virtual currencies do not have monetary value
in the state.122
However, Texas regulators have taken a stronger stance
against I.C.O.s.123  Specifically, on January 11, 2017, the Texas State
Securities Board filed an emergency cease and desist order against
BitConnect,124 a virtual currency company offering securities in the
form of tokens through agents recruited to advertise such sales in
Texas.125  The order concluded that BitConnect registered neither
their offering nor their company with the proper regulators.126
Additionally, the order alleges that BitConnect fraudulently
promised profits to investors while failing to disclose material infor-
mation and making misleading statements in violation of Texas’s
securities law.127  By acting in this manner, Texas has likened
I.C.O.s to traditional securities offerings, even though virtual cur-
rencies are not currency.  Similarly, in early 2018, the Massachusetts
Securities Division (Securities Division) issued five consent orders
against companies purporting to offer I.C.O.s, which the Securities
Division categorized as “unregistered or non-exempt securities.”128
Each consent order prohibits the offer or sale of any offering unless
the company registers with the Securities Division or establishes
that the offering is exempt from securities registration and requires
the company to provide notice to the requisite state authority.129
In an action potentially providing clarification to service prov-
iders and consumers, Wyoming’s House of Representatives unani-
mously passed two House bills exempting virtual currency from
Wyoming’s Money Transmitter Act and exempting specific coin
sales from blue sky securities regulations, provided that the token
122. KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’R, REGULATORY TREATMENT
OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE KANSAS MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT 3
(June 6, 2014), http://bit.ly/2zlUbpq.
123. See BitConnect, ENF-18-CDO-1754, 8 (Tex. State Sec. Bd. Jan. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter BitConnect Cease and Desist] (emergency cease and desist order).
124. What Is BitConnect?, BITCONNECT, http://bit.ly/2DmCj1K (last visited
Sept. 8, 2018) (“BitConnect is an open source all in one bitcoin and crypto commu-
nity platform designed to provide multiple investment opportunities with
cryptocurrency education . . . .”).
125. Id.; Nikhilesh De, Texas Regulator Orders BitConnect to Call Off Token
Sale, COINDESK (Jan. 5, 2018), http://bit.ly/2xFba3X.
126. BitConnect Cease and Desist, supra note 123, at 5–6.
127. Id. at 6–8.
128. See Sparkco, Inc., E-2018-0017, 6 (Mass. State Sec. Sec. Div. Mar. 27,
2018); PinkRibbon ICO, E-2018-029, 5 (Mass. State Sec. Sec. Div. Mar. 27, 2018);
Mattervest, Inc., E-2018-0011, 5 (Mass. State Sec. Sec. Div. Mar. 27, 2018); Across
Platforms Inc., E-2018-0016, 5 (Mass. State Sec. Div. Mar. 27, 2018); 18Moons,
Inc., E-2018-0010, 5 (Mass. State Sec. Div. Mar. 27, 2018).
129. See sources cited supra note 128.
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sold is exchangeable for some good or service.130  Both House bills
are now under review by the State Senate.
Delaware legislators tackled regulation of blockchain assets
from a different angle.  Delaware’s General Corporation Code now
authorizes the use of “distributed electronic networks or databases”
to store corporate records.131  The effect of this change is that trad-
ers may use blockchain technology as a trading platform.132
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a New York regulatory
agency issued strict requirements for virtual currency businesses
within the state.133  The New York Department of Financial Ser-
vices was the first state regulatory body in America to impose regu-
lations on virtual currencies.134  The regulation, called the
BitLicense, defines virtual currency business activity and requires
qualifying service providers to obtain a license in order to conduct
business in the state lawfully.135  Critics deride the BitLicense for
providing vague definitions, overtaking federal anti-money launder-
ing regulation jurisdiction, and issuing exorbitant compliance costs
which preclude innovation.136
130. H.B. 19, 64th Leg., 2018 Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018) (exempting virtual
currency from the Wyoming Money Transmitter Act); H.B. 70, 64th Leg., 2018
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018) (exempting specific I.C.O.s from securities regulations).
131. See S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb., §§ 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 151(f), 202(a), 219(a),
219(c), 224, 232(c), 364 (Del. 2017).
132. See Jeff John Roberts, Companies Can Put Shareholders on a Blockchain
Starting Today, FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 2017), https://for.tn/2MRnG6h.
133. See Pete Rizzo, Final BitLicense Proves Divisive Milestone in US Bitcoin
Regulation, COINDESK (June 3, 2015), http://bit.ly/2NwIHrO (“[T]he law imposes a
higher threshold for compliance on bitcoin startups than those in traditional finan-
cial services.”); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, §§ 200.14–16 (2017).
134. Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 166 (2017).
135. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q) (2017).  The regulation
defines Virtual Currency Business Activity as:
[T]he conduct of any one of the following types of activities involving
New York or a New York Resident:
(1) receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or Transmitting Vir-
tual Currency, except where the transaction is undertaken for non-
financial purposes and does not involve the transfer of more than a
nominal amount of Virtual Currency;
(2) storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual
Currency on behalf of others;
(3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
(4) performing Exchange Services as a customer business; or
(5) controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.
Id.
136. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 200.14–16 (2017) (requiring
registered companies to comply with strict disclosure and auditing requirements);
Andrea Castillo, Hey, New York: Bitcoin Doesn’t Need a BitLicense, FOUND. FOR
ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 15, 2015), http://bit.ly/2puHC5I; Peter Van Valkenburgh, Our
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Similarly, Washington State permits virtual currency transmit-
ters to operate in the state upon licensure.137  Service providers
must retain a minimum amount of funds to cover consumer
claims,138 and virtual currency receives the same treatment as fiat
currency.139  The definition of “virtual currency” excludes “the
software or protocols governing the transfer of the [virtual cur-
rency] or other uses of . . . distributed ledger systems to verify own-
ership or authenticity . . . when the virtual currency is not used as a
medium of exchange.”140
Hawaii went a step further than both New York and Washing-
ton and banned virtual currency transmitters from receiving a
money transmitter license, a necessary component for conducting
money transmitting business in the state.141  As a result of Hawaii’s
directive, major service providers that had established services in
the state, like Coinbase, had no other option but to cease opera-
tions in Hawaii.142
2. Federal Treatment of Blockchain-Assets
Several federal agencies have issued notices and engaged in en-
forcement proceedings regarding virtual currencies and blockchain-
based assets.143  In July 2017, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) announced that I.C.O.s are subject to federal securities regu-
lations.144  The SEC also announced that celebrity endorsements of
I.C.O.s145 could expose celebrities to liability for violating federal
securities laws, further underscoring SEC treatment of I.C.O.s as
Thoughts on the BitLicense: California Is Winning, COINCENTER (June 3, 2015),
http://bit.ly/2xOKdLB.
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.030 (2017) (explaining when a Virtual Cur-
rency license is required).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.050 (2017).
139. See WASH. REV. ADMIN. CODE § 19.230.010(18) (2017).  The Act defines
money transmission to include “receiving money or its equivalent value,” which
can include virtual currency. Id.
140. Id. at § 19.230.010(30).
141. See Press Release, Haw. Dep’t of Commerce & Consumer Affairs, News
Release: State Warns Consumers on Potential Bitcoin Issues (Feb. 26, 2014), http://
bit.ly/2QPiJ0Q.
142. See Higgins, supra note 7.
143. See Maria Terekhova, More Bitcoin Regulations Are Coming, BUS. IN-
SIDER (July 10, 2017), https://read.bi/2O6Yrla.
144. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), http://
bit.ly/2MSxUmL (describing which tokens would be securities, but stopping short
of declaring all tokens subject to securities regulations).
145. Id.
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securities.146  In an effort to further educate investors about fraudu-
lent offerings, the SEC created a parody website advertising a coin
offering called “HoweyCoins,” which exhibits multiple characteris-
tics cited by the SEC as signs of fraudulent offerings.147  In late
2017, a former SEC commissioner condemned the SEC’s lack of
action, and he “contact[ed] current commission officials and staff to
urge them to bring cases, and fast.”148
Seemingly in response to this call to action, in 2018 the SEC
announced two settlements with a broker-dealer and a hedge fund
charged with securities violations.149  These actions are the first of
their kind, and were only announced post-resolution.150  Interest-
ingly, both decisions characterize the offerings in question (referred
to as “certain digital assets”151 or “certain digital tokens”152) as se-
curities and fail to name which specific virtual currencies were in-
volved.  By shielding which exact currencies were determined to be
securities by the commission, the settlement announcements pro-
vide little insight into the SEC’s determination process.
In a 2015 ruling, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) determined that “[b]itcoin and other virtual cur-
rencies are . . . properly defined as commodities.”153  Interestingly,
the CFTC further found that virtual currencies are “distinct” from
nation-based “legal tender.”154  As a result of this ruling, the CFTC
brought an enforcement action against Bitfinex, a virtual currency
146. Public Statement, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Statement Urging Caution
Around Celebrity Backed ICOs (Nov. 1, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xxtm0a.
147. See ICO – Howeycoins, INVESTOR.GOV, http://bit.ly/2MSymkX (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2018) (listing I.C.O. red flags such as claims of high returns, celebrity
endorsements, claims of compliance with regulatory bodies including the SEC,
credit card compatibility, and more).
148. Nathaniel Popper, Initial Coin Offerings Horrify a Former S.E.C. Regula-
tor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2QS8kBo.
149. See In re Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP, Exchange Act Release No. 10,544,
2018 WL 4329663 (Sept. 11, 2018); In re TokenLot LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 84075, 2018 WL 4329662 (Sept. 11, 2018); see also Press Release, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges Digital Asset Hedge Fund Manager with Misrepresenta-
tions and Registration Failures (Sept. 11, 2018), http://bit.ly/2zn3kON; Press Re-
lease, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges ICO Superstore and Owners with
Operating as Unregistered Broker-Dealers (Sept. 11, 2018), http://bit.ly/2OFIPBV.
150. See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Digital Asset
Hedge Fund Manager with Misrepresentations and Registration Failures (Sept. 11,
2018), http://bit.ly/2zn3kON; Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges
ICO Superstore and Owners with Operating as Unregistered Broker-Dealers
(Sept. 11, 2018), http://bit.ly/2OFIPBV.
151. In re Crypto Asset Management, LP., 2018 WL 4329663, at *2.
152. In re TokenLot LLC, 2018 WL 4329662, at *3.
153. In re Coinflip, CFTC No. 15-29, 2016 WL 3137612, at *2 (Sept. 17, 2015).
154. Id. at n.2.
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trading platform.155  The CFTC ruling found that Bitfinex violated
the Commodity Exchange Act because they did not “actually de-
liver” the bitcoin purchased through their service offerings.156  De-
fining “actual delivery” has become a contentious subject, but the
CFTC proposes an interpretation specific to margin trading157 on
virtual currency exchanges which is currently in the notice-and-
comment period.158
In 2018, the SEC and CFTC issued a joint statement that their
respective enforcements focus on prohibiting fraudulent activity.159
Both agencies vowed to “look beyond form, examine the substance
of the activity[,] and prosecute violations of the federal securities
and commodities laws.”160  Additionally, the commissioners of both
the CFTC and SEC testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs concerning each commis-
sion’s respective regulatory focuses.161  Both commissioners empha-
sized their commitment to providing “clarity and fairness to [the
virtual currency] space.”162  As such, the SEC and CFTC demon-
strate a commitment to harmonizing regulatory initiatives with one
another, and have shown an understanding that compartmental-
izing regulations through the specific use of virtual currency would
provide interested parties with much needed clarity.
In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) noted that
property tax principles apply to virtual currencies.163  If property
155. In re BFXNA Inc., CFTC No. 16-19, 2016 WL 3137612, at *4–5 (June 2,
2016).
156. Id. at 2.
157. Margin Trading, NASDAQ, http://bit.ly/2xvkLuZ (last visited Sept. 8,
2018) (“Buying securities, in part, with borrowed money.”).
158. Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency, 82 Fed. Reg.
60335 (proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.) [hereinafter CFTC]
(interpreting actual delivery as used in the Commodity Exchange Act to include
examples of virtual currency transactions).
159. Public Statement, Stephanie Avakian and Steven Peikin, Co-Enforce-
ment Dirs., Sec. Exch. Comm’n, and James McDonald, Enforcement Dir., Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n, Joint Statement by SEC and CFTC Enforcement
Directors Regarding Virtual Currency Enforcement Actions (Jan. 19, 2018), http://
bit.ly/2MPXmJv.
160. Id.
161. Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of
Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n).
162. Id.
163. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, http://bit.ly/2xwh8Fd; see also
Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Pub-
lic Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1532 (2016) (“[S]ale of goods or services
in exchange for [b]itcoins is a barter transaction, at least for American tax pur-
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tax principles applied to virtual currencies, any profit incurred from
the sale or exchange of virtual currency would be taxed as a capital
gain, instead of as income.164  Members of Congress who have
formed a caucus called the “Blockchain Caucus”165  proposed a bill,
later not adopted in the 2017 tax reform bill, called the “Cryptocur-
rency Tax Fairness Act” to address issues stemming from the IRS
determination.166
The United States Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), issued a notice stating virtual
currency exchange administrators qualify as money transmitters
and must register as Money Services Businesses.167  In line with this
notice, FinCEN imposed a fine of over $110,000,000 against BTC-e,
a virtual currency exchange transacting both in fiat and virtual cur-
rencies in 2017.168  FinCEN found that BTC-e violated anti-money
laundering laws and facilitated fraudulent and illegal transactions,
including those involved in drug trafficking and ransomware.169
In late 2018, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FinRA)170 issued its first disciplinary action involving virtual cur-
rency against a Massachusetts broker.  FinRA characterized the
prohibited activity in the action as “creating, offering, and selling
unregistered cryptocurrency securities.”171
poses.  While the IRS approach is not innately hostile to virtual currency, it could
make life difficult for end-users who, . . . use it as a currency for daily purchases.”).
164. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, http://bit.ly/2xwh8Fd.
165. CONG. BLOCKCHAIN CAUCUS, https://www.congressionalblockchaincau
cus.com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (supporting a laxer regulatory approach that
allows the blockchain technology landscape to develop before regulators step in).
166. Matthew De Silva, Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Amendment Not
Adopted by House Tax Reform Bill, ETHNEWS (Nov. 15, 2017), http://bit.ly/
2zn3DZX (“[T]he act would create a de minimis exemption for any cryptocurrency
transactions below $600, relieving consumers of ‘burdensome reporting require-
ments’. . . requiring the Treasury Department to issue guidelines for . . . reporting
on cryptocurrency transactions for which capital gains is due . . . .”).
167. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-
G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 3 (2013).
168. In re BTC-E, FinCEN No. 2017-03, 1–3 (July 26, 2017).
169. Id. at 2.
170. Although FinRA is a non-profit organization, it is congressionally au-
thorized under the Securities Exchange Act as a registered, self-regulatory securi-
ties organization for the broker-dealer industry. See Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits
to the Fifth Amendment: Examining the Benefits That Flow from a Private Regula-
tor’s Ability to Demand Answers to Its Questions During an Investigation, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 210, 218–23 (describing the organizational structure and his-
tory of FinRA as well as the relationship between FinRA and the SEC).
171. Complaint at 1, Dep’t of Enf’t v. Timothy Tilton Ayre, Disciplinary Proc.
No. 2016049307801 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Authority Office of Hearing Officers
Sept. 11, 2018).
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Although these federal bodies certainly influence the industry,
the question remains:  how much weight, if any, will the federal
courts assign to their actions?  In United States v. Zaslavskiy,172 the
Eastern District of New York held that two specific I.C.O.s may
constitute securities offerings under federal criminal law.173  In
2017, Maksim Zaslavskiy was charged with three counts of securi-
ties fraud related to two I.C.O.s:  REcoin Group Foundation (“RE-
coin”) and Diamond Reserve Club (“DRC”).174
The Department of Justice claimed that Zaslavskiy misled in-
vestors by fraudulently claiming both REcoin and DRC were
backed by real estate smart contracts175 and diamonds,176 respec-
tively.  In its order denying Zaslavskiy’s motion to dismiss, the
Eastern District held that it is for the factfinder to determine
whether both I.C.O.s constitute securities offerings under the tell-
all Howey test,177 but a reasonable jury would be able to do so
based on both Howey and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.178
This decision did not definitively state whether the specific
I.C.O.s involved or, in the broader scheme, all I.C.O.s are securi-
ties, but found that the charges were sufficient to continue to
trial.179  Interestingly, although the Zaskavskiy reasoning is in line
with the SEC’s previous statements on I.C.O.s, the Zaslavskiy court
referred to the SEC’s actions as secondary authority on the matter,
relying heavily on the application of Howey.180  The Zaslavskiy de-
172. United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17CR647(RJD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
156574 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018).
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id. at *4.
176. Id. at *6.
177. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. was a landmark case decided by the Supreme
Court in 1946. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
The Howey court developed a test to determine whether an investment contract
constitutes a security within the meaning of the Securities Act:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a con-
tract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests [their] money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests
in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
Id. at 298.
178. Zaslavskiy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156574, at *2.
179. Id. at *6.
180. Compare supra note 144 and accompanying text, with Zaslavskiy, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156574, at *29 n.10 (“Whether and when the SEC chooses to
engage in formal rulemaking regarding the regulation of digital assets is of no mo-
ment here.”).
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cision was predicated on securities case law applying Howey rather
than regulatory guidance specific to virtual currencies.
III. ANALYSIS
With no uniform guidance in the United States, “regulatory
bodies, courts[,] and state legislatures have acted independently re-
sulting in a regulatory mishmash of guidance, clarification, exten-
sion[,] and ongoing discussion.”181  There is a distinct need to give
service providers and consumers clear and uniform guidance, as evi-
denced by the inability of companies to offer services in regions
that are unfriendly, the varying state and federal182 definitions of
virtual currency, and the many consumer harms183 that result from
disparate regulation.184
A. The Uniform Law Commission
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC), a non-profit entity,
“provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state
statutory law.”185  ULC commissioners include legislators, judges,
and attorneys.186
To begin drafting a proposed uniform act, the ULC’s Scope
and Program Committee first investigates the underlying area of
law and makes a determination as to whether a uniform law is feasi-
ble.187  After the initial investigation, the Executive Committee de-
181. Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at 305.
182. Supra Part II.E.
183. Supra Part II.E.
184. Elizabeth Sarah Ross, Note, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The
Disruptive Role of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and
Current Regulatory Issues, 25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 353, 381 (2017).  This note
claims that without strong uniform regulatory language, America will create an
unfriendly environment for innovation and fail to sufficiently protect consumers:
The absence of a national charter . . . jeopardizes American institutions’
relevance in the development of the future global financial system by cre-
ating an environment that is inhospitable to innovators. Given the ab-
sence of any incentives for banks to collaborate with FinTechs, it is
arguable that there will be an increase in cybersecurity threats posed to
financial institutions who do not update their cyber risk protocol. Thus,
financial stability will not be attained under current virtual currency regu-
lations and in turn, threatens the privacy of financial and personal identi-
fiable information.
Id.
185. About the ULC, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://bit.ly/2xBwBmC (last
visited Sept. 8, 2018).
186. Id.
187. ULC Drafting Process, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://bit.ly/2I5H5zD
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
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termines whether to approve or reject the proposal for a uniform
law.188  If approved, the Executive Committee appoints a “drafting
committee of commissioners” to draft a uniform law.189  Once the
drafting committee reaches a consensus, drafts go to the entire
ULC for an initial debate before the Committee of the Whole.190
Once the Committee of the Whole approves a proposed draft,
a quorum composed of a majority of the states must approve the
proposed law before “officially adopt[ing]” it.191  After approving
the uniform law, the ULC publishes the proposed law for review by
individual states.192  Commissioners then advocate for adoption of
the uniform law’s language in their respective states.193
On July 19, 2016, the ULC completed the drafting process of
the “Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act”
(“proposed regulation”), a proposed model regulation for the regu-
lation of virtual currency businesses.194  Nebraska is the first state
that has proposed to adopt a version of the Act, and Hawaii and
Connecticut have followed suit.195
B. What Is Proposed by the “Uniform Regulation of Virtual
Currency Businesses Act”?
The proposed regulation provides a clear definition of virtual
currency.196  In addition to clearly defining virtual currency, the
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT (NAT’L CONFER-
ENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
195. L.B. 987, 115th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2018); Raised Bill 5496, Gen. As-
semb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2018); S.B. 2129, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2018).
196. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 102(23).  The
proposed regulation provides that a virtual currency:
(A) [is] a digital representation of value that:
(1) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value;
and
(2) is not legal tender, whether or not denominated in legal tender; and
(B) does not include:
(1) a transaction in which a merchant grants value as part of an affinity
or rewards program, which value cannot be taken from or exchanged
with the merchant for legal tender, bank credit, or virtual currency; or
(2) a digital representation of value issued by or on behalf of the pub-
lisher and used within an online game, game platform, or family of
games sold by the same publisher or offered on the same game
platform.
Id.
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Uniform Law provides a concise and constrained definition of what
virtual currency business activity is.197  By using definitive language
for these two key terms, the proposed regulation creates a defined
zone of liability that, if implemented uniformly at the state level,
would provide a much-needed foundational standard for service
providers across the country.
1. Criticisms of the Proposed Regulation
Critics of the proposed regulation consider the ULC’s under-
taking premature and find that the language stifles innovation.198
Further, critics may argue that this solution can create disparate im-
plementation of the uniform law, the problem it seeks to mend.199
If states are given the latitude to implement the proposed regula-
tion in whatever manner they see fit, disparate application of the
proposed uniform law may still obstruct harmonization.200
a. The Prematurity of Regulating an Emerging Industry
It is simple to say that adoption of a uniform regulatory
scheme for virtual currency businesses is premature because
blockchain technology is quickly developing and difficult to fit into
197. Id. § 102(25). The proposed regulation defines virtual-currency business
activity as:
(A) exchanging, transferring, or storing virtual currency or engaging in
virtual-currency administration, whether directly or through an agree-
ment with a virtual-currency control-services vendor;
(B) holding electronic precious metals or electronic certificates represent-
ing interests in precious metals on behalf of another person or issuing
shares or electronic certificates representing interests in precious metals;
or
(C) exchanging one or more digital representations of value used within
one or more online games, game platforms, or family of games for:
(i) virtual currency offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from
which the original digital representation of value was received; or
(ii) legal tender or bank credit outside the online game, game platform,
or family of games offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from
which the original digital representation of value was received.
Id.
198. Dan Cummings, ULC’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Busi-
nesses Act Creates Divide, ETHNEWS (July 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xGqQ7d.
199. See Knight, supra note 134, at 168 (“Although these efforts seek to har-
monize (at least to a degree) the regulation of virtual currencies at the state level,
states seem to be moving in their own directions, albeit in fits and starts.”).
200. See Knight, supra note 134, at 186–87 (“Even if states all agree to a uni-
form law and the law remains uniform as enacted, there is always the risk that
some states will change their laws or their statutory and regulatory
interpretations.”).
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one category.201  However, adopting a uniform regulation for spe-
cific known implementations addresses existing applications with-
out precluding innovation.202  Evidenced by the precise definitions
used in the proposed regulation, the ULC limits regulation to spe-
cific, clearly defined activities.203
Since blockchain technology is quickly developing, language
that restricts regulation to known existing implementations would
prevent overbroad applicability while still allowing the space to
grow.  The CFTC has also acknowledged this conundrum, stating
that it “does not intend to create a bright line definition [of virtual
or digital currency] given the evolving nature of the commodity and
. . . its underlying public distributed ledger technology.”204
States will begin to regulate virtual currency whether or not a
uniform regulation exists, which underscores the need for unified
language and action.205  Although financial regulations historically
utilize “a combination of ex ante and ex post regulation to mitigate
systemic risk in the financial system,”206 virtual currencies are a
burgeoning and pervasive technology; waiting ex post to create uni-
form language would dig a regulatory hole too big to climb out
from.207  If regulators delay establishing a uniform standard, the
dangers to consumers will only increase as bitcoin and virtual cur-
rency adoption becomes more and more widespread.208
201. Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 574 (2016) (“[F]inancial regulators must develop a
better understanding of blockchain technology’s impact potential as they continue
to engage in its pragmatic regulation.”); Llew Classen, The Foul Smell of State
Cryptocurrency Legislation, MEDIUM (July 14, 2017), http://bit.ly/2QNnUhT
(“ULC legislation is . . . regulating a nascent industry prematurely.”).
202. What Are Uniform Laws?, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://bit.ly/2pr0YIM (last
visited Sept. 8, 2018) (“As interstate business and individual movement have in-
creased in the U.S. the felt need for greater uniformity of law on particular sub-
jects has grown.”).
203. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 102(25) (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017) (listing exchanging, stor-
ing, or transferring virtual currency as the only regulated activities).
204. CFTC, supra note 158, at 60338.
205. Supra Part II.E.
206. Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of
Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV.
191, 211 (2016) (arguing that self-regulation embedded within the technology is the
most practical method of implementing uniform regulations of blockchain
technology).
207. Ross, supra note 184, at 380–81 (“By falling behind in the global finan-
cial technological revolution, overly broad regulations and vague administrative
guidance that do not directly address blockchain technology stifle innovation, and
economic growth will decrease financial institutional capabilities to combat cyber-
security threats.”).
208. Supra Part II.D.
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b. The Viability of Implementing a Uniform Regulation State-
by-State
The proposed regulation creates a statutory structure unique to
virtual currencies instead of trying to fit virtual currencies into ex-
isting regulatory frameworks.209  Using the ULC’s standard conven-
tions as a foundation, state regulators can work to adopt regulations
that apply to different uses of the technology as the industry contin-
ues to grow.210  It can be argued that allowing states to implement
different versions of the proposed regulation fails to adequately ad-
dress the problem the regulation seeks to resolve.
Although adoption of the proposed regulation would not nec-
essarily provide state-by-state uniformity, the proposed language
includes allowances for businesses “licensed to conduct virtual cur-
rency business activity by a state with which this state has a reci-
procity agreement.”211  If implemented in this manner,
interoperability across the country would not be a barrier to busi-
nesses licensed in one state.
Additionally, it is prudent to consider the procedure behind
passing laws. One commentator noted:
Obtaining passage of legislation in Congress is a difficult proposi-
tion in most cases, and speed is a rarity, particularly in the ab-
sence of a national emergency. For even the most admirable
work of the [ULC], the enactment goal is multiplied times fifty
states—plus U.S. territories. Such deliberative processes are a
benefit and result in greater stakeholder inclusion.212
In the case of virtual currencies, the benefit of implementing a
uniform state regulation unique to virtual currency businesses
would outweigh the costs to the state as well as the industry.  Some
costs include the considerable time and resources spent attempting
to fit virtual currencies into different existing regulatory
frameworks and the ambiguity this disparate regulation provides
users and service providers.213  The ULC has done a majority of the
209. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 201(2) (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
210. ULC Drafting Process, supra note 187 (“Model Acts are designed to
serve as guideline legislation, which states can borrow from or adapt to suit their
individual needs and conditions.”).
211. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 201(2).
212. Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of
Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1537 (2016).
213. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT, prefatory note at
1; Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at 347 (“[T]he mere extension of laws crafted to
respond to the risks presented by established payment systems, financial services,
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legwork by bringing together an interdisciplinary group of industry
leaders and jurists to craft the language of the proposed
regulation.214
The simplest solution to ameliorate the problems posed by ex-
isting state regulatory efforts is the enactment of a federal regula-
tory scheme.215  However, as evidenced by various agencies’
intersecting interests in regulating blockchain assets in the various
forms they take, urging a federal regulatory scheme for the regula-
tion of blockchain assets is a larger behemoth to conquer than com-
parable state efforts.216
c. Regulation as a Threat to Innovation
Critics of the proposed regulation believe it is too similar to the
BitLicense in New York, and that such similarities stifle possible
innovation within the virtual currency industry.217  After implemen-
tation of the BitLicense, “a slew of bitcoin startups” left New York
and investment vehicles tend to be insufficient to control the same dangers when
they are transferred to the online world of virtual currency.”).
214. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT, prefatory note at
11 (“The essence of creating a uniform state law is to obtain a sufficient consensus
as a result of striking a balance among the interests of the various constituencies
that will be affected by the act when enacted into law by the state legislatures.”).
215. Supra Part II.E.1.
216. Federal regulatory bodies that have issued blockchain related enforce-
ment actions or guidance have targeted blockchain based assets from different
viewpoints—as a security, commodity, or property. See supra Part II.E.2.  In order
to create regulatory harmonization across federal agencies, agencies should con-
sider creating a forum similar to the Federal Interagency Committee on Emer-
gency Medical Services, where multiple federal agencies that regulate similar
issues come together to create interoperable regulatory schemes. See Michael J.
Denning, Code Blue! Ambulance Manufacturing Specifications May Pre-Empt
State Common Law Claims, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 85, 103 n.107 (2001)
(“FICEMS[ ] serves as a forum to establish and facilitate effective communication
and coordination between and among Federal departments and agencies involved
in activities related to EMS.”).  An alternative solution to state-by-state money
transmitter licensing for virtual currency businesses engaged in banking was pro-
posed by the United States’ Comptroller of the Currency, who announced that the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency will consider “national bank charter
applications from [financial technology].”  See Joseph Otting, OCC’s Otting: Why
Do State Regulators Want to Limit Consumer Choice?, AM. BANKER (Sept. 18,
2018), http://bit.ly/2E2cX9T.  A national banking charter would be a welcome solu-
tion for financial companies engaged in banking, but the question facing many
virtual currency businesses is whether they are required to apply for licensing,
which is not clearly answered by enveloping virtual currency businesses into ex-
isting federal frameworks.  Although a federal solution to regulatory uncertainty is
outside of the scope of this Comment, it will be interesting to see how the federal
government continues to find solutions to the problems posed by this uncertainty.
217. Letter from Llew Claasen, Exec. Dir., Bitcoin Foundation, to the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 14, 2017), http://
bit.ly/2I6Imq2.
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due to the burdensome and costly licensing process.218  In a nascent
field, high compliance costs could cut the knees from beneath a
startup company.219  Innovators will likely leave unfriendly, costly
jurisdictions for more hospitable ones.220
However, the proposed regulation applies only to custodial
service providers, which are businesses that maintain control and
custody over user funds.221  Additionally, the proposed regulation
carves out several exemptions for emerging industry players to test
out their products, as long as the volume of currency in question is
less than $5,000.222  New companies would fall under an exemption
mandating compliance under a “‘lite’ regulatory scheme,” which
provides for a limited implementation of mandatory practices.223
The exemption provided by the proposed regulation allows
fledgling virtual currency businesses an opportunity to grow with-
out stringent compliance costs, unlike those regulated by the
BitLicense.224
If regulators craft regulations with innovation in mind, such
laws will not stifle the growth and development of the industry.225
Clear and uniform regulatory language limited to specific busi-
nesses and instances of conduct would foster a more hospitable vir-
tual currency community in the United States.
C. Every State Should Adopt the Proposed Regulation
The remaining states should follow Nebraska and Hawaii by
introducing the proposed regulation for enactment.226  Reciprocity
218. Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of Bitcoin Startups from New
York, FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015), https://for.tn/2OIckDn.
219. Id. (“[T]he [bit]license comes at a price that exceeds the market opportu-
nity of servicing New York residents. Therefore, we have no option but to with-
draw our service from the state.”) (quotations omitted).
220. Id.
221. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 103 (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).  It is worth noting that
legislation exempting non-custodial service providers from obtaining licensure as a
money transmitter, money services business, or financial institution has been intro-
duced to Congress. See Blockchain Regulatory Certainty Act, H.R. 6974, 115th
Cong. (2018).
222. Id. § 103(b)(8).
223. Id. cmt. 2.
224. Roberts, supra note 218.
225. Kevin D. Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the
Law, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (“Regulation is often posed as the
antithesis of innovation . . . [but] [r]egulation of the internet was actually an impor-
tant step in its widespread adoption.”).
226. UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT; L.B. 987, 115th
Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2018); Raised Bill 5496, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn.
2018); S.B. 2129, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2018).
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between states, as provided by the proposed regulation, would miti-
gate several issues presented by disparate regulation of virtual cur-
rency businesses.227  Further, compliance costs to service providers
would be less burdensome once each state has identical or at least
harmonized requirements, and exemptions would foster innovation
in the field.
IV. CONCLUSION
Virtual currency service providers in America must navigate
murky legislative and regulatory waters with no uniform virtual cur-
rency guidance.228  As interest in and adoption of virtual currencies
increase, so too does the risk of misuse and consumer harms.229
State and federal regulators have separately attempted to address
and opine on these concerns, but have done so disparately.230
Instead of enlarging pre-existing regulatory schemes to cover
virtual currency, the ULC has crafted a licensing framework with
both the industry and public welfare in mind.231  Adoption of the
proposed regulation within every state is a critical step toward pro-
viding virtual currency businesses with clarity and consumers with a
degree of safety in transacting.232
The ULC’s approach clearly defines virtual currency terminol-
ogy and outlines which activities and businesses require licenses to
operate.233  States should implement a carefully crafted approach to
regulating specific implementations of blockchain technologies, and
the ULC provides the necessary framework for such implementa-
tion.  Exploring the vastly expanding world of virtual currencies
and blockchain technologies through a regulatory lens does not
have to be at the expense of innovation.
227. ULC Drafting Process, supra note 187 (“Model Acts are designed to
serve as guideline legislation, which states can borrow from or adapt to suit their
individual needs and conditions.”).
228. Shahla Hazratjee, Bitcoin: The Trade of Digital Signatures, 41 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 55, 83–84 (2015) (“Given the different approaches to regulation,
and the uncertainty in how the regulatory framework of any one state may apply
to Bitcoin businesses, ‘misunderstandings’ . . . are not surprising . . . [and] the
potential growth of the Bitcoin related start-up businesses are, at the very least,
being discouraged.”).
229. Supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text (discussing the various con-
sumer liabilities that arise from the lack of regulatory clarity guiding virtual cur-
rency transactions).
230. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at 304 (“[R]egulatory bodies, courts
and state legislatures have acted independently resulting in a regulatory mishmash
of guidance, clarification, extension and ongoing discussion.”).
231. Supra Part III.B.
232. Supra Part III.B.
233. Supra Part III.B.
